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Abstract
Eliaz (2004) has established a meta-theorem for preference aggre-
gation which implies both Arrow's Theorem (1963) and the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem (1973, 1975). This theorem shows that the driving
force behind impossibility theorems in preference aggregation is the mu-
tual exclusiveness of Pareto optimality, individual responsiveness (prefer-
ence reversal) and non-dictatorship.
Recent work on judgment aggregation has obtained important gener-
alizations of both Arrow's Theorem (List and Pettit 2003, Dietrich and
List 2007a) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Dietrich and List
2007b).
One might ask, therefore, whether the impossibility results in judg-
ment aggregation can be unified into a single theorem, a meta-theorem
which entails the judgment-aggregation analogues of both Arrow's The-
orem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. For this purpose, we
study strong monotonicity properties (among them non-manipulability)
and their mutual logical dependences. It turns out that all of these mono-
tonicity concepts are equivalent for independent judgment aggregators,
and the strongest monotonicity concept, individual responsiveness, implies
independence. We prove the following meta-theorem: Every systematic
non-trivial judgment aggregator is oligarchic in general and even dicta-
torial if the collective judgment set is complete. However, systematicity
is equivalent to independence for blocked agendas. Hence, as a corol-
lary, we obtain that every independent (in particular, every individually
responsive) non-trivial judgment aggregator is oligarchic.
This result is a mild generalization of a similar theorem of Dietrich
and List (2008), obtained by very different methods. Whilst Eliaz (2004)
and Dietrich and List (2008) use sophisticated combinatorial and logical
arguments to prove their results, we utilize the filter method (cf. e.g.
Dietrich and Mongin, unpublished) and obtain a much simpler and more
intuitive derivation of our meta-theorem.
Key words: Judgment aggregation; independence axiom; monotonicity
axiom; oligarchy; impossibility results; non-manipulability; partial ratio-
nality.
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1 Introduction
The emerging literature on judgment aggregation (for a survey see List and
Puppe [14]), which can be seen as an extension of the analysis of aggregation
problems from preferences to arbitrary information, has already provided some
generalizations of results in classical Arrovian social choice theory (see e.g. Di-
etrich and List [5]).
Recently, Dietrich and List [4] have established a judgment aggregation ana-
logue to the second-most famous theorem in social choice theory, the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem1.
In the light of recent attempts by Reny [16] and Eliaz [10] at establishing
a meta-theorem incorporating both the Arrow and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem2, their finding that a strong condition of non-manipulability is already
equivalent to the conjunction of two properties used in Arrovian type impossi-
bility results, namely independence and monotonicity is suggestive of a common
mechanism driving both types of impossibility results.
For the Arrovian framework this property was identified by Eliaz [10] as
preference reversal, which essentially means that the collective preference be-
tween two alternatives can only be inverted, if there exists an individual whose
preference exhibits precisely this inversion.
In order to obtain his meta-theorem, Eliaz defines this property for general
social aggregators which encompass both social welfare functions and social
choice functions as special cases. This is necessary because, the property of non-
manipulability is originally defined for the latter, i.e. for mappings from profiles
of preference orderings on a given set of alternatives into this set of alternatives
(and not into the set of preferences like in the case of social welfare functions).
Essentially a social aggregator is a mapping from the set of all preference profiles
into an arbitrary set of binary relations. In case this set is the set of all binary
relations with a unique best alternative which is related to any other of the
otherwise unrelated alternatives, a social aggregator is equivalent to a social
choice function that directly maps into the set of alternatives, whereas in case
the co-domain is the set of all preference orderings, we obviously have a social
welfare function.
In the framework of judgment aggregation a similar generalization can be
obtained by relaxing the condition that the co-domain of a judgment aggregator
be identical with the set D of all consistent and complete judgment sets. We
shall also relax the condition that the domain of the judgment aggregator be a
Cartesian power of N . (For similar generalizations see Dietrich and List [6].) In
the following section we formally define judgment aggregators and identify the
property, called individual responsiveness, which is shown in the third section
to drive both types of impossibility results via a strong variant of independence
known as systematicity.
1The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem essentially establishes that the only non-manipulable
social choice function is a dictatorship. See Gibbard [11] and Satterthwaite [17] for the original
references; for a survey see Barbera [1].
2For an early analysis of this connection see Batteau, Blin, and Monjardet [2].
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2 Framework
Let X be a set of formulae of some monotonic logic, e.g. propositional logic
or modal logic. X will be called the agenda. We assume that X is the union
of proposition-negation pairs. In other words, there exists a set Y such that
X =
⋃
p∈Y {p,¬p, }.
Let D be the set of consistent and complete subsets of X, let D∗ denote the
set of consistent and deductively closed subsets of X, and let D′ be the set of
deductively closed subsets of X. Clearly, D ⊆ D∗ ⊆ D′.
We shall not assume full rationality, neither at the individual, nor at the
collective level. While we assume deductive closedness for both individual and
collective judgments, consistency is only assumed at the individual level. Consis-
tency of the collective judgment sets in our meta-theorems will be a consequence
of the other assumptions imposed.
Definition 2.1 For any set of individuals N with cardinality n, a judgment
aggregator is a mapping f : Df → D′ from a subset Df of the n-fold Cartesian
product (D∗)n of the set of all consistent deductively closed judgment sets into
the set of all deductively closed judgment sets.
For terminological and notational convenience an element A = (A1, ..., An)
of Df will be called a profile, and for any profile A ∈ Df and any proposition
p ∈ X, A(p) = {i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai} will denote the set of individuals who hold
proposition p, i.e. whose judgment sets contain p.
3 Rationality axioms for judgment aggregators
via individual responsiveness
The following property will be essential for our analysis of judgment aggregators:
Definition 3.1 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ satisfies individual re-
sponsiveness if for every proposition p ∈ X and all profiles A,A′ ∈ Df ,
p /∈ f(A) ∧ p ∈ f(A′)⇒ ∃i ∈ N : i /∈ A(p) ∧ i ∈ A′(p).
This property can be considered extremely natural, as it only requires that
an aggregator should be positively responsive to individual characteristics, i.e.
a change in the social outcome should be justified by a corresponding change in
an individual's judgment.
It however turns out that this property is quite strong as it can be shown
to be closely related to several well-known properties of judgment aggregation
rules.
3.1 Arrovian rationality: monotonicity and independence
via individual responsiveness
Definition 3.2 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is independent if for
every proposition p ∈ X, and all profiles A,A′ ∈ Df ,
p ∈ f(A) ∧A′(p) = A(p)⇒ p ∈ f(A′).
Lemma 3.3 Every individually responsive judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is
independent.
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Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exist profiles A,A′ ∈ Df and a
proposition p ∈ X such that p /∈ f(A) albeit p ∈ f(A′) and A(p) = A′(p).
The latter equality implies plainly that there cannot be an individual i with
i /∈ A(p) and i ∈ A′(p) and therefore contradicts individual responsiveness.
(In other words, the change in the collective outcome was not obtained by the
change of some individual's judgment with respect to p.)
An important class of judgment aggregator attributes are monotonicity prop-
erties of various strengths.
Definition 3.4 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is strongly monotonic
if for all profiles A,A′ ∈ Df and every proposition p ∈ X,
p ∈ f(A) ∧A(p) ( A′(p)⇒ p ∈ f(A′).
A further strenghtening of strong monotonicity gives the property of iso-
tonicity.3
Definition 3.5 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is isotonic if and only if
for all profiles A,A′ ∈ Df and every proposition p ∈ X, even
p ∈ f(A) ∧A(p) ⊆ A′(p)⇒ p ∈ f(A′).
In fact, the following equivalence is easily seen:
Lemma 3.6 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is isotonic if and only if it is
both independent and strongly monotonic.
Proof. The if-part is clear: In the definition of isotonicity, we may consider
profiles A,A′ ∈ Df with either A(p) = A′(p) (which leads to independence) or
A(p) ( A′(p) (which leads to strong monotonicity).
For the only-if part, suppose that f is not isotonic. Then there exist profiles
A,A′ ∈ Df and a proposition p such that
A′(p) ⊇ A(p), p ∈ f(A), p /∈ f(A′).
Since f is independent, this means A′(p) ) A(p), which, however, contradicts
strong monotonicity.
For comparison, it is not difficult to see that strong monotonicity actually
coincides with Dietrich and List's [4] notion of monotonicity for independent
judgment aggregators (see Lemma 3.10 below).
When defining monotonicity, Dietrich and List [4] use the concept of the
i-variant of a profile. Two profiles are i-variants if they agree for all individuals
but i. Formally:
Definition 3.7 For every individual i ∈ N and all profiles A,A′ ∈ Df , the
profile A is an i-variant of A′ if and only if Ai 6= A′i but Aj = A′j for all i 6= j.
This yields the following variants of monotonicity:
Definition 3.8 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is monotonic if for all
p ∈ X, all individuals i ∈ N and all i-variants A,A′ ∈ Df with p /∈ Ai and
p ∈ A′i,
p ∈ f(A)⇒ p ∈ f(A′).
3The notion of isotonicity is, by the way, the direct analogue of the monotonicity concept
used in preference aggregation.
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Definition 3.9 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is weakly monotonic if
for all p ∈ X, all individuals i ∈ N and judgment sets A1, . . . , Ai−1, Ai+1, An,
if there exists a pair of i-variants A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Df and A′ =
(A1, . . . , Ai−1, A′i, Ai+1, . . . , An) ∈ Df with p /∈ Ai and p ∈ A′i, then there exists
at least one such pair of i-variants A,A′ ∈ Df such that
p ∈ f(A)⇒ p ∈ f(A′).
Lemma 3.10 For an independent judgment aggregator f : Df → D′, the fol-
lowing properties are equivalent:
• weak monotonicity,
• monotonicity,
• strong monotonicity, and
• isotonicity
Proof. We have already observed that isotonicity is equivalent to strong mono-
tonicity for independent judgment aggregators. Also, it is clear that strong
monotonicity is sufficient for monotonicity and weak monotonocity (even with-
out independence). Dietrich and List [4] proved that monotonicity is both nec-
essary and sufficient for weak monotonocity if f is independent. We will now
show that strong monotonicity is necessary for monotonicity if f is indepen-
dent.
Suppose, for an argument by contraposition, that f is independent, but not
strongly monotonic. Then there exist profiles A,A′ ∈ Df and a proposition p
such that
A′(p) ) A(p), p ∈ f(A), p /∈ f(A′).
But n is finite, whence these profiles A,A′ can even be chosen in such a way
that A′(p) = A(p) ∪ {i} ) A(p) for some individual i. (This can be proven
formally through backward induction on the cardinality of A′(p) \ A(p).) The
independence of f also implies that p /∈ f(A′) holds for each A′ satisfying
A′(p) = A(p)∪{i}, thus for every i-variant A′ of A with p ∈ A′i. This contradicts
monotonicity.
Corollary 3.11 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is isotonic if and only if
it is both independent and weakly monotonic.
Lemma 3.12 Every individually responsive judgment aggregator f : Df → D′
is strongly monotonic.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that an individually responsive aggregator f
is not strongly monotonic. Due to the independence of f (see Lemma 3.3), we
may utilize the characterization of monotonicity in Lemma 3.10 and obtain that
f cannot even be monotonic. Then there exists an individual i, a proposition
p ∈ X as well as i-variants A,A′ ∈ Df such that
p /∈ Ai, p ∈ A′i, p ∈ f(A), p /∈ f(A′),
and in particular, the equivalence j ∈ A(p)⇔ j ∈ A′(p) holds for every individ-
ual j 6= i. Hence for all j ∈ N , either j ∈ A′(p) (e.g. ! for j = i) or j /∈ A(p).
This contradicts individual responsiveness.
In fact, the following equivalence is easily shown.
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Theorem 3.13 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is individually responsive
if and only if it is both independent and strongly monotonic.
Proof. The only-if-part is given by Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.12.
For the if-part, consider, for a proof by contraposition, a judgment aggregator
which is not individually responsive. If this aggregator is not a constant function,
then for some proposition p and some profile A ∈ Df with p ∈ f(A) there exists
a profile A′ ∈ Df with p /∈ f(A′) such that either A(p) = A′(p) (violating
independence) or A(p) ( A′(p) (violating strong monotonicity).
Corollary 3.14 For every judgment aggregator f : Df → D′, the following are
equivalent:
1. f is individually responsive.
2. f is independent and either strongly monotonic or monotonic or weakly
monotonic.
3. f is isotonic.
Thus, the natural property of individual responsiveness provides an interest-
ing justification not only for monotonicity4 but also for the more controversial
condition of independence.
3.2 Game-theoretic rationality: non-manipulability via
individual responsiveness
It remains to investigate the relation between individual responsiveness and
non-manipulability.
Definition 3.15 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is non-manipulable
if for every individual i ∈ N , all i-variants A,A′ ∈ Df , and every proposition
p ∈ Ai,
p /∈ f(A)⇒ p /∈ f(A′).
A judgment aggregator is manipulable if it is not non-manipulable.
Dietrich and List [4] employ a stronger notion of non-manipulability, which
also rules out that an individual could prevent a collective choice by submitting
an inaccurate judgment set:
Definition 3.16 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is strongly non-
manipulable if for every individual i ∈ N , all i-variants A,A′ ∈ Df , and
every proposition p ∈ X,
p ∈ Ai ∧ p /∈ f(A)⇒ p /∈ f(A′), as well as
p /∈ Ai ∧ p ∈ f(A)⇒ p ∈ f(A′).
Obviously, strong non-manipulability implies non-manipulability. The con-
verse holds if the range of the judgment aggregator consists only of complete
judgment sets.
4Dietrich [3] also studies another weak monotonicity condition, named judgment-set-wise
monotonicity, and proves that it is equivalent to monotonicity under the assumption of uni-
versal domain (i.e. Df = D) and independence.
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Another aspect of the strength of both non-manipulability conditions con-
sists in the fact that, unlike the usual definition of strategy-proofness based
on preferences, non-manipulability excludes any effective manipulation with re-
spect to a particular proposition independently of its potential negative overall
effect in terms of individual preference satisfaction with respect to the collec-
tive outcome: The opportunity to manipulate by itself does not guarantee that
the agent has an incentive to do so. However, Dietrich and List [4] show that
strategy-proofness and non-manipulability can coincide.
Lemma 3.17 1. A strongly non-manipulable judgment aggregator f : Df →
D′ is non-manipulable.
2. An independent non-manipulable judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is
strongly non-manipulable.
3. If f : Df → D′ is a non-manipulable judgment aggregator and f(A) ∈ D
for all A ∈ Df , then f is strongly non-manipulable.
In the proof, we adopt the usual convention that ¬p means q if p = ¬q for
some q ∈ X.
Proof.
1. Trivial.
2. Consider, for a proof by contraposition, an individual i, two i-variants
A,A′ ∈ Df , and a proposition p /∈ Ai such that p ∈ f(A), but p /∈
f(A′). The independence of f then entails that A(p) 6= A′(p) and therefore
p ∈ A′i. Since f is non-manipulable, this readily yields p /∈ f(A), a
contradiction.
3. Consider again an individual i, two i-variants A,A′ ∈ Df , and a proposi-
tion p /∈ Ai such that p ∈ f(A). We shall prove that p ∈ f(A′). From the
completeness of Ai, we obtain ¬p ∈ Ai, and from the consistency of f(A),
we get ¬p /∈ f(A). As f is non-manipulable, this implies ¬p /∈ f(A′). The
completeness of f(A′) finally yields p ∈ f(A′).
In the rest of this section, we shall address the relation between individual
responsiveness and (strong) non-manipulability: We shall prove that individ-
ual responsiveness is equivalent to strong non-manipulability, which in turn is
equivalent to the combination of non-manipulability and independence.
Lemma 3.18 Every individually responsive judgment aggregator f : Df → D′
is non-manipulable.
Proof. Consider, for a proof by contraposition, a manipulable judgment aggre-
gator f . Then there exist: an individual i ∈ N , i-variants A,A′ ∈ Df , and a
proposition p ∈ Ai such that p /∈ f(A) but p ∈ f(A′). We have to prove that
f is not individually responsive. Let j ∈ N . If j = i, then j ∈ A(p) as p ∈ Ai.
If j 6= i, then the equivalence j ∈ A(p) ⇔ j ∈ A′(p) holds because of Aj = A′j .
Hence for all j ∈ N , either j ∈ A(p) or j /∈ A′(p), contradicting individual
responsiveness.
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Theorem 3.19 An independent judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is non-
manipulable if and only if it is monotonic.
Proof. Due to Corollary 3.14, Lemma 3.18 already shows that the conjunction
of independence and monotonicity is sufficient for non-manipulability.
Consider now, for a proof by contraposition, a judgment aggregator f which
is independent, but not monotonic. This gives us a proposition p ∈ X and
some i-variants A,A′ ∈ Df with p ∈ Ai and p /∈ A′i such that p /∈ f(A), albeit
p ∈ f(A′). This makes the judgment aggregator f manipulable (by individual
i).
By Corollary 3.14, we already obtain:
Corollary 3.20 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is individually responsive
if and only if it is both non-manipulable and independent.
The following result, a straightforward generalization of Dietrich and List's
[4] findings, states an additional condition on the aggregator's domain under
which the strong notion of non-manipulability even entails independence. (Di-
etrich and List [4] impose the assumption of universal domain, i.e. Df = Dn,
instead.)
Lemma 3.21 Suppose f is a judgment aggregator with Df = En for some
E ⊆ D∗. If f is strongly non-manipulable, then f is independent.
Proof of Lemma 3.21. Consider, for a proof by contraposition, a non-
independent judgment aggregator. Then there exists a proposition p ∈ X and
profiles A,A′ ∈ Df such that A(p) = A′(p) while p /∈ f(A) but p ∈ f(A′). Define
now, for all k ≤ n, a profile A(k) by A(k)i = A′i for all i ≤ k and A(k)i = Ai for
all i > k. Then A(i−1) and A(i) are i-variants for all i > 0, whilst A(0) = A and
A(n) = A′.
There must be some i > 0 such that p ∈ f(A(i)) and p /∈ f(A(i−1))  for,
otherwise one could prove by backward induction on i that p ∈ f(A(i)) for all
i ≤ n, contradicting p /∈ f(A) = f(A(0)).
In other words, there exists an individual i ∈ N such that for some pair
of i-variants A(i−1), A(i) ∈ Df (which can be obtained by exchanging some
judgment sets of the individuals in A by those of the corresponding individuals
in A′) one has p /∈ f(A(i−1)) but p ∈ f(A(i)). This individual i can manipulate
the collective outcome, in a sense forbidden by strong non-manipulability:
• If p ∈ Ai, then p ∈ A(i−1)i by construction of A(i−1), although p /∈
f(A(i−1)). In this case, an individual i with judgment set A(i−1)i = Ai
(i.e. i wants p to be socially accepted) can purport A(i)i = A′i in order to
obtain f(A(i)) 3 p as social outcome.
• If p /∈ Ai, then p /∈ A′i (as A(p) = A′(p)), so p /∈ A(i)i by construction of
A(i), whilst p ∈ f(A(i)). In this case, an individual i with judgment set
A
(i)
i = A
′
i (i.e. i wants to prevent the social acceptance of p) can pretend
A
(i−1)
i = Ai in order to obtain f(A(i−1)) 63 p as social outcome.
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Observe that in this proof, we do not know whether p ∈ Ai, therefore the
weak variant of non-manipulability does not suffice to prove independence.
Theorem 3.22 Suppose f is a judgment aggregator with Df = En for some
E ⊆ D∗. Then f is strongly non-manipulable if and only if it is both independent
and non-manipulable.
Proof. If f is strongly non-manipulable, then it is clearly non-manipulable
and independent by Lemma 3.21. Conversely, if f is independent and non-
manipulable, then it is strongly non-manipulable by Lemma 3.17.
Summarizing, we have shown:
Corollary 3.23 For every judgment aggregator f : Df → D′, the following are
equivalent:
1. f is independent and strongly non-manipulable.
2. f is independent and non-manipulable.
3. f is individually responsive.
4. f is isotonic.
5. f is independent and either strongly monotonic or monotonic or weakly
monotonic.
Corollary 3.24 Suppose Df = En for some E ⊆ D∗. Then even the following
are equivalent:
1. f is strongly non-manipulable.
2. f is independent and non-manipulable.
3. f is individually responsive.
4. f is isotonic.
5. f is independent and either strongly monotonic or monotonic or weakly
monotonic.
4 Oligarchies, systematically
In this section, we adapt the findings of Dietrich and Mongin [7] on the re-
lationship between independence, systematicity, unanimity preservation, and
oligarchic (respectively dictatorial) judgment aggregators for the establishment
of our meta-theorem.
Our account of Dietrich and Mongin's [7] results is a little more general as
we relax the condition Df = Dn to Dn ⊆ Df in the relevant theorems.
Systematicity is a priori a very strong condition as it combines independence
and neutrality: Systematicity not only requires that the collective acceptance
of any proposition should only depend on the individual judgments on that
proposition but also that this pattern of dependence should be the same for
every proposition.
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Nevertheless, it can be shown to follow from independence as soon as addi-
tional assumptions on the logical structure of the agenda are imposed. In the
presentation of this argument, we follow Eckert and Klamler [9].
Apart from being a powerful technical tool, the (ultra)filter method illus-
trates the quasi-duality between the logical structure of the agenda (given by
the logical interconnections between the propositions) on the one hand and the
social structure of the population (given by the distribution of decision power)
on the other hand. It is thus of conceptual interest in its own right.
It is useful to distinguish the concept of a winning coalition in general from
the notion of a decisive coalition for a given proposition p in the agenda. The
former encompasses all possible coalitions that can force just some collective
decision to be made (no matter on what subject), whereas the latter applies to
those coalitions which can ensure a favorable collective judgment on some given
p.
Through analyzing the set-theoretic closure properties of the collection of
winning coalitions, Dietrich and Mongin [7] obtained a necessary and sufficient
criterion for a judgment aggregator to be oligarchic. In light of our charac-
terization of individual responsiveness in the first part of the present paper, we
shall see that this criterion is, under logical richness assumptions on the agenda,
just the conjunction of individual responsiveness and respect for unanimity in
a strong sense (see Corollary 4.28).
Given that individual responsiveness is the judgment-aggregation equivalent
of preference reversal and that respect for unanimous judgments corresponds to
the Pareto property, this Corollary 4.28 is the judgment-aggregation analogue
of Eliaz' [10] meta-theorem.
This result has two interesting immediate consequences: First, individual
responsiveness and respect for unanimity only entail oligarchic judgment ag-
gregation, whereas in Eliaz' [10] meta-theorem for preference aggregation, the
conjunction of preference reversal and the Pareto principle already implies dic-
tatorship. Thus, preference aggregation is more susceptible to dictatorial im-
possibility results than general judgment aggregation. Second, since individual
responsiveness is equivalent to independence and non-manipulability (see Corol-
lary 3.23), we finally obtain an impossibility result featuring non-manipulability
as well (Corollary 4.29). Unlike Dietrich and List [6, Theorem 3], we do not
need to assume collective rationality. In return, our impossibility result in Corol-
lary 4.29 yields merely an oligarchy, rather than a dictatorship.
4.1 Independence, immediate decisiveness and system-
aticity
Using a concept well established in social choice theory, one can analyse judg-
ment aggregation rules f by collecting those coalitions which are decisive under
f for some proposition in the agenda.
Definition 4.1 Let p ∈ X. We say that some coalition U ⊂ I is decisive for
p under f if for every A′ ∈ Df , if U = A′(p), then p ∈ f(A′). The collection of
decisive coalitions for p is denoted Wp.
Extending this concept from coalitions to aggregators, we arrive at the fol-
lowing definition:
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Definition 4.2 A judgment aggregator f satisfies immediate decisiveness if
for all A ∈ Df and p ∈ f(A), the coalition A(p) is decisive for p.
This notion is actually equivalent to independence:
Lemma 4.3 f is independent if and only if it satisfies immediate decisiveness.
Proof. First, let f be independent. Let A ∈ Df and p ∈ f(A). Suppose
A′ ∈ Df is such that A(p) = A′(p). By independence, p ∈ f(A′).
Conversely, let f satisfy immediate decisiveness. Then, for all A ∈ Df and
every p ∈ f(A), the set A(p) is decisive  in other words, p ∈ f(A′) holds
whenever A′ ∈ Df satisfies A(p) = A′(p). Thus, we already have
∀A,A′ ∈ Df
(
p ∈ f(A)⇒ (A(p) = A′(p)⇒ p ∈ f(A′))) ,
which is tantamount to
∀A,A′ ∈ Df
(
p ∈ f(A) ∧A(p) = A′(p)⇒ p ∈ f(A′)) .
Lemma 4.4 Suppose f is independent. For all p ∈ X and A ∈ Df , p ∈ f(A)
if and only if A(p) ∈ Wp.
Proof. If p ∈ f(A), then A(p) ∈ Wp by Lemma 4.3. Conversely, if A(p) ∈ Wp,
then clearly p ∈ f(A) (put A = A′ in the definition of decisiveness).
Observe that the equivalence in 4.3 defines what is known in the literature
on judgment aggregation as "voting by issues" (cf. Nehring and Puppe [15]).
Obviously, the aggregation problem crucially depends on the properties of
the agenda, essentially the logical connections between the propositions in the
agenda.
Following Dokow and Holzman [8], the logical connections between the
propositions in any agenda X are captured by a binary relation `∗⊂ X ×X of
conditional entailment.
Definition 4.5 For any distinct propositions p, q ∈ X, we write p `∗ q if there
exists a minimally inconsistent superset S of {p,¬q} (i.e. there exists some set
P ⊂ X\{p,¬q} such that S := P ∪ {p,¬q} is inconsistent while every proper
subset of S is a consistent set of propositions).
Thus for any two distinct propositions p, q ∈ X, (p, q) ∈`∗ means that
there exists a set of propositions P ⊂ X\{p,¬q} conditional on which holding
proposition p entails holding proposition q.
Example 4.6 Consider an agenda X = {p,¬p, q,¬q, p∨ q,¬(p∨ q), p∧ q,¬(p∧
q)}. Then the set S = {¬p, p ∨ q,¬q} is a minimally inconsistent set which
establishes the conditional entailment relation between e.g. ¬p and q.
Definition 4.7 An agenda X will be called totally blocked if the relation of
conditional entailment has full transitive closure, i.e. if T (`∗) = X ×X.
Total blockedness means that any proposition in the agenda is related to
any other proposition by a sequence of conditional entailments.
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Example 4.8 Verify that the above agenda X = {p,¬p, q,¬q, p∨q,¬(p∨q), p∧
q,¬(p ∧ q)} is totally blocked, while neither the agenda Y = {p,¬p, q,¬q, p ∧
q,¬(p ∧ q)} nor Z = {p,¬p, q,¬q, p ∨ q,¬(p ∨ q)} is totally blocked.
While this property might appear quite strong, Dietrich and Mongin [7]
rightly observe that it is compatible with highly indirect logical connections.
In social choice theory the Pareto principle  enshrining respect for unani-
mous preferences  is firmly established. In the framework of judgment aggre-
gation, two ways to express this principle present themselves:
Definition 4.9 f : Df → D′ is said to be unanimity-preserving if and only
if for all p ∈ X and for every A ∈ Df such that A(p) = N , one has p ∈ f(A).
Definition 4.10 f : Df → D′ is called strictly unanimity-respecting if and
only if for all p ∈ X and A ∈ Df , one has p ∈ f(A) if A(p) = N and p 6∈ f(A)
if A(p) = ∅.
Obviously, if f : Dn → D, then f is already strictly unanimity-respecting if
it is just unanimity-preserving.
Lemma 4.11 Suppose Dn ⊆ Df and f is independent as well as unanimity-
preserving. For all p, q ∈ X, if p `∗ q, then Wp ⊆ Wq.
Proof. Let P ⊆ X \ {p,¬q} be a non-empty set such that P ∪ {p,¬q} is
minimally inconsistent. Consider any U ∈ Wp. Since every consistent set can be
extended to a consistent and complete set, there exists a profile A ∈ Dn ⊆ Df
such that A(p) = U ∈ Wp, A(q) = U and A(r) = N for all r ∈ P . By
Lemma 4.3, p ∈ f(A), and since f is unanimity-preserving, also P ⊆ f(A).
However, P ∪ {p} ` (¬q → ⊥) by modus ponens (as P ∪ {p,¬q} ` ⊥), so
P ∪ {p} ` q by modus tollens.
Therefore, f(A) ` q, and since f(A) ∈ D′, finally q ∈ f(A). Again by
Lemma 4.3, we arrive at U =Wq ∈ A(q).
In fact, the logical structure of the agenda can induce a strong neutrality
condition known as systematicity in the judgment aggregation literature:
Definition 4.12 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is systematic if for any
propositions p, q ∈ X, and any profiles A,A′ ∈ Df ,
p ∈ f(A) ∧A′(q) = A(p)⇒ q ∈ f(A′).
Lemma 4.13 Assume that X is a totally blocked agenda. Suppose Dn ⊆ Df
and f is independent as well as unanimity-preserving. Then, f is systematic.
Proof. An iterated application of Lemma 4.11 yieldsWp =Wq for all p, q ∈ X.
Therefore, for any p, q ∈ X and A,A′ ∈ Df with A(p) = A′(q), we have the
equivalence of A(p) ∈ Wp and A′(q) ∈ Wq. By Lemma 4.4, this means that
p ∈ f(A) holds if and only if q ∈ f(A′).
4.2 Impossibility results
For the following reasoning, we collect all coalitions which win the collective
outcome for some proposition into a single set:
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Definition 4.14 If f is a judgment aggregator, the family Ff :=
{A(p) : A ∈ Df , p ∈ f(A)} is called the collection of winning coalitions.
In order to use Ff as a technical tool, we need the following result:
Lemma 4.15 Suppose f is systematic. For all A ∈ Df and p ∈ X, one has
A(p) ∈ Ff if and only if p ∈ f(A).
Proof. If A(p) ∈ Ff , then there is some A′ ∈ Df and some q ∈ f(A′) such that
A(p) = A′(q). But as f is systematic, this can only be true if already p ∈ f(A).
The converse implication is trivial.
Definition 4.16 X is called rich if and only if there are propositions p, q ∈ X
such that each of the propositions p∧q,¬p∧q, p∧¬q is consistent and an element
of X.
Definition 4.17 f is called trivial if either X ⊆ f(A) for all A ∈ Df or
f(A) ∩X = ∅ for all A ∈ Df .
Remark 4.18 If f is strictly unanimity-respecting, then it is not trivial.
Remark 4.19 If f is unanimity-preserving and f : Df → D, then f is strictly
unanimity-respecting (and hence non-trivial).
The next lemma is the basis for our impossibility results. It must be noted
that it does not assume unanimity preservation or strict respect for unanimity
(i.e. the Pareto principle) as an extra axiom. This result is a mild generalization
of a result by Herzberg [12] who obtained it as part of an algebraic character-
ization of systematic non-trivial judgment aggregators; we shall give a direct
proof.
Lemma 4.20 Assume X is rich. If Dn ⊆ Df and f : Df → D′ is systematic
as well as non-trivial, then Ff is a filter.
Herein, we have imposed another moderate assumption about the richness
of the agenda, which mirrors Lauwers and Van Liedekerke's [13] aggregator
domain condition (A1') and is related to a similar agenda condition imposed by
Dietrich and List [6, agenda condition (i)] (which in turn was first introduced
as non-median space condition in abstract aggregation theory by Nehring and
Puppe [15]).
Proof. We write F for Ff .
1. Superset closedness. Suppose U ′ ⊇ U ∈ F . Since every consistent set
can be extended to a consistent and complete set, there exists a profile
A ∈ Dn ⊆ Df such that
∀i ∈ U p∧q ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ U ′\U p∧¬q ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N \U ′ ¬p∧q ∈ Ai.
Since A(p ∧ q) = U ∈ F , we have p ∧ q ∈ f(A) by Lemma 4.15 and thus
p ∈ f(A) as f(A) is deductively closed. Hence A(p) = U ′ ∈ F .
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2. Intersection closedness. Suppose U,U ′ ∈ F . Since every consistent set
can be extended to a consistent and complete set, there exists a profile
A ∈ Dn ⊆ Df such that
∀i ∈ U∩U ′ p∧q ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ U\U ′ p∧¬q ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N\U ¬p∧q ∈ Ai.
Then
F 3 (U ∩ U ′) ∪ (U \ U ′) = A(p),
so A(p) ∈ F . Likewise
F 3 U ′ ⊆ (U ∩ U ′) ∪ (N \ U) = A(q),
so A(q) ∈ F since we have already established that F is closed under
supersets. By Lemma 4.15, p, q ∈ f(A) so p ∧ q ∈ f(A) as f(A) ∈ D′.
Therefore U ∩ U ′ = A(p ∧ q) ∈ F .
3. Non-triviality. We have already seen that Ff is superset-closed. If it
were the case that ∅ ∈ Ff , then A(p) ∈ Ff for every p ∈ X and every
A ∈ Df , therefore p ∈ f(A) for every p ∈ X and every A ∈ Df . This
would contradict the non-triviality of f .
Similarly, if it were the case that Ff = ∅ then p 6∈ f(A) for every p ∈ X
and every A ∈ Df , hence f(A) ∩ X = ∅ for every A ∈ Df , which again
would contradict the non-triviality of f .
Definition 4.21 A judgment aggregator f : Df → D′ is said to be oligarchic
if there exists some M ⊆ N such that for all p ∈ X and A ∈ Df ,
p ∈ f(A)⇔ ∀i ∈M p ∈ Ai.
Lemma 4.22 Assume f is systematic. Then f is oligarchic if and only if Ff
is a filter.
Proof.
1. By the classification of filters on finite sets: Ff is a filter if and only if
there is a set Mf ⊆ N such that
Ff =
⋂
i∈Mf
{U ⊆ N : i ∈ U} ,
2. Combining this with Lemma 4.15: Ff is a filter if and only if there is a
set Mf ⊆ N such that for all p ∈ X and A ∈ Df ,
p ∈ f(A)⇔ A(p) ∈ Ff ⇔ ∀i ∈Mf i ∈ A(p)
⇔ ∀i ∈Mf p ∈ Ai ⇔ p ∈
⋂
i∈Mf
Ai,
thus f(A) =
⋂
i∈Mf Ai for all A ∈ Df .
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3. Therefore Ff is a filter if and only if there is a set Mf ⊆ N such that
f(A) =
⋂
i∈Mf Ai for all A ∈ Df .
Another mild assumption on the agenda involves the existence of contingent
sentences. (A sentence p is contingent if both {p} and {¬p} are consistent.)
Lemma 4.23 Suppose X contains a contingent sentence. If f is oligarchic and
f : Df → D, then f is dictatorial.
Proof. Let Mf be the set of oligarchs. Note that Mf 6= ∅, for otherwise we
would have f(A) = P(X) 6∈ D for all A ∈ Df . Suppose, for a contradiction that
Mf has more than one element. Then there are individuals i, i′ ∈ N such that
f(A) ⊆ Ai ∩Ai′ for all A ∈ Df . Consider a contingent sentence p, and let A be
a profile with p ∈ Ai and p 6∈ Ai′ . By consistency of Ai, ¬p 6∈ Ai. Therefore,
p,¬p 6∈ Ai ∩Ai′ , so p,¬p 6∈ f(A), whence f(A) ∈ D, contradiction.
Theorem 4.24 Assume X is rich. If Dn ⊆ Df and f : Df → D′ is systematic
as well as non-trivial, then f is oligarchic.
Proof. Combine Lemma 4.22 with Lemma 4.20.
The technical agenda richness condition specified in Lemma 4.20 and Theo-
rem 4.24 follows, for example, from total blockedness.5
Lemma 4.25 Suppose X is totally blocked and there exists a contingent sen-
tence in X. Then there are p, q ∈ X such that the sets {p, q}, {¬p, q}, {p,¬q}
are each consistent.
Proof. Dietrich and List [6, Lemma 8] have shown that there exists a minimal
inconsistent Y ⊆ X of cardinality ≥ 3. By the compactness of propositional
logic, Y must be finite. Let Y = {p, q, r1, . . . , rm} for some m ≥ 1 and sentences
p, q, r1, . . . , rm in X. Since Y = {p, q, r1, . . . , rm} ` ⊥, modus ponens yields
{p, r1, . . . , rm} ` (q → ⊥), therefore {p, r1, . . . , rm} ` ¬q by modus tollens.
But {p, r1, . . . , rm} is consistent as Y is minimal inconsistent, therefore {p,¬q}
is consistent, too. Interchanging the rôles of p and q in this argument shows
that {q,¬p} is consistent as well. Finally Y = {p, q, r1, . . . , rm} is minimal
inconsistent, so {p, q} must also be consistent.
Corollary 4.26 Assume X is a totally blocked agenda which is closed under ∧
and contains a contingent sentence. Then X is rich.
Corollary 4.27 Assume X is a rich, totally blocked agenda. Suppose Dn ⊆ Df .
If f : Df → D′ is independent as well as strictly unanimity-respecting, then f
is oligarchic and hence monotonic as well.
Proof. Since X is totally blocked, Lemma 4.13 ensures that f is systematic.
Therefore, Lemma 4.25 allows us to apply Theorem 4.24.
Thus, we finally arrive at the meta-theorem announced earlier in this section:
Corollary 4.28 Assume X is a rich, totally blocked agenda. Suppose Dn ⊆
Df . The aggregator f : Df → D′ is both individually responsive and strictly
unanimity-respecting if and only if it is oligarchic.
5This was pointed out to the authors by Dr. Franz Dietrich (personal communication).
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Proof. Let f be individually responsive and strictly unanimity-respecting. By
Lemma 3.3. f is independent. Therefore, Corollary 4.27 shows that f is oli-
garchic.
Conversely, every oligarchic aggregator is not only strictly unanimity-
respecting, but also independent and monotonic and hence individually respon-
sive by Theorem 3.13.
An important consequence, Corollary 4.28 and Corollary 3.23 provide the
following impossibility result:
Corollary 4.29 Assume X is a rich, totally blocked agenda. Suppose Dn ⊆
Df . The aggregator f : Df → D′ is independent, non-manipulable and strictly
unanimity-respecting if and only if it is oligarchic.
As shown by Dietrich and List [6, Theorem 3], total blockedness is not only
sufficient, but even necessary for the oligarchy results in Corollaries 4.27, 4.28,
4.29, provided the population has at least three members.
If we impose the additional assumption that the range of f is contained
in D, that the collective judgment set is complete, then Lemma 4.23 allows
us to replace the attribute oligarchic by dictatorial in Theorem 4.24 and
Corollaries 4.27, 4.28, and 4.29.
5 Discussion
Assuming a totally blocked agenda, we have shown that strictly unanimity-
respecting judgment aggregators are oligarchic if they are either individually re-
sponsive or both indepedent and (in a weak sense) non-manipulable. However,
individual responsiveness is also equivalent to the conjunction of independence
and monotonicity. Thus, the independence property is an important ingredient
in our meta-theorems for (oligarchic) impossibility results in judgment aggrega-
tion.
The concept of individual responsiveness can be seen as a justification for
assuming judgment aggregation rules to be independent. An alternative ap-
proach in defending the independence property would be to invoke Dietrich
and List's [4] strong concept of non-manipulability, which is equivalent to the
conjunction of monotonocity and independence. However, this strong notion
of non-manipulability is already equivalent to the conjunction of independence
and a weaker, but simpler notion of non-manipulability. For this reason, inde-
pendence should be vindicated via individual responsiveness rather than non-
manipulability.
Summarizing, we have found three reasons why independence is a pivotal
axiom in judgment aggregation:
1. Independence follows from individual responsiveness, the analogue of the
meta-theorem condition of preference reversal.
2. For independent judgment aggregators, all non-manipulability and mono-
tonicity properties are equivalent.
3. In combination with the Pareto principle (unanimity preservation), inde-
pendence yields oligarchies under certain agenda conditions.
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Mathematically, the independence axiom derives its importance from its
intricate relation to systematicity, as systematicity is a key to the application
of the filter method.
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